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Available online 20 February 2006The preparation effect in task switching can be interpreted to reflect
cognitive control processes during the interval between task-cue onset
and the trial-stimulus onset which support the flexible and rapid
configuration of response dispositions. However, it is an open issue what
neural processes underlie this effect. In the present study, healthy
volunteers underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
while performing a cued task switching paradigm, in which geometric
objects had to be classified according to either color or shape. By
manipulating the duration of the cue-target-interval (CTI) in the range
between 0 and 1500ms, we were able to dissociate brain activity changes
related to the processing of either the cue or the target. A network of
frontal and parietal brain areas was activated during advance
preparation for the upcoming task independent of whether the task
was switched or repeated. The same brain regions also showed increased
neural activity in response to targets without advance preparation in
contrast to targets with advance preparation which only elicited
activations in areas involved in visual processing and motor execution.
These findings strongly argue for a Ftask-set activation perspective_ on
advance preparation in task switching [Altmann, E.M., 2004. Advance
preparation in task switching: what work is being done? Psychol. Sci. 15,
616–622.], whereas no empirical support could be found for the Fmental
gear changing model_ of task switching as no significant brain activity
changes were observable in association with task switches, switch costs,
or the interaction effect of advance preparation on switch costs. Finally,
in the light of previous behavioral studies on interference effects of
articulatory suppression on task preparation in humans, the present
findings are compatible with the assumption that verbalization mech-
anisms, e.g., the retrieval of a verbal task or goal representation into
working memory may be a functional component of advance configu-
ration of task-sets.
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A central aspect of cognitive control is the ability to prepare for
specific task requirements before one actually has to respond to an
imperative stimulus. Task preparation supports flexible and rapid
reactions to environmental events and enables one to plan actions
in advance to environmental conditions. Specifically in humans,
advance preparation may also involve verbal mechanisms due to
the unique endowment of humans with language (e.g., Deacon,
1997), which may act as endogenous control processes.
The cued task switching paradigm offers a valuable method for
investigating task preparation. In this paradigm, subjects are
required to rapidly switch between two or more choice reaction-
time tasks. The task cue indicates the task rule before the task
actually has to be executed, which makes it possible to temporally
dissociate task preparation from task execution. Because the task
rules change between the tasks, there is a constant need for the
subjects to adjust to the currently relevant task-set (Meiran, 1996;
Mayr and Kliegl, 2000). This involves a cognitive control effort that
according to some authors (e.g., Meiran et al., 2000) is reflected in
the so-called switch costs. Consistent with this assumption that
reconfiguration of a task-set takes time and requires cognitive
resources, several studies using different task-switching paradigms
have shown that the response time costs incurred by a switch
between different tasks is substantially reduced if participants are
given time to prepare for the new task prior to the imperative
stimulus (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996; Meiran et
al., 2000). However, it is still a matter of controversy whether a
reduction of switch costs after a long preparation interval reflects the
advanced preparatory reconfiguration of the task-set (Rogers and
Monsell, 1995; Meiran et al., 2000), a strengthening of the task
representation to overcome task-set inertia (Allport et al., 1994;
Meiran et al., 2000), or a reduced proportion of trials on which
participants fail to engage in preparatory control processes (De
Jong, 2000). Furthermore, it has also been suggested by other
researchers that the reduction of switch costs may not involve any
switch-specific control process at all (Logan and Bundesen, 2003;
Altmann, 2004). Recently, an alternative view on cognitive control
in task switching has been put forward by Altmann (2004) which
Fig. 1. Experimental design. An example of a sequence of two trials is
displayed.
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functional process in cognitive control. In contrast to the Fmental
gear changing perspective_ taken by most of the authors cited above,
this Ftask-set activation perspective_ considers the main effect of
task preparation, i.e., the overall reduction of reaction times both in
switch and in repeat trials, to be an index of functional control
processes whereas switch costs may emerge as a side effect, for
instance, of priming (Altmann, 2004). These two models, the
Fmental gear changing model_ and the Factivation model_, make
different predictions also with regard to brain activation underlying
cognitive control processes in a task-switching experiment.
To shed additional light on these conflicting hypotheses that
were mainly derived from behavioral studies some neuroscientists
have recently tried to dissociate the neuronal mechanisms
underlying advance preparation (MacDonald et al., 2000; Sohn
et al., 2000; Luks et al., 2002; Rushworth et al., 2002; Brass and
von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Peria´n˜ez et al., 2004; Forstmann et al.,
2005). While some authors focused on preparation for task switches
(Sohn et al., 2000; Rushworth et al., 2002; Peria´n˜ez et al., 2004),
task preparation was also investigated from a more general
perspective (MacDonald et al., 2000; Luks et al., 2002; Brass and
von Cramon, 2002, 2004). Most of these studies point to an
important role of several frontal regions as key parts in a network
which also involves posterior association cortices (Sohn et al.,
2000; MacDonald et al., 2000; Luks et al., 2002; Brass and von
Cramon, 2002, 2004; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Peria´n˜ez et al., 2004).
However, within these widespread networks, different studies have
also yielded substantial differences with respect to the specific brain
areas activated in task switching. This heterogeneity in the
empirical record may be mainly due to the use of different task
switching paradigms. Correspondingly, in behavioral studies it has
been shown that task preparation processes for explicit task cuing
and predictability of task order might differ (Koch, 2003), and that
the cue identity (whether the cue is a word or a single letter) might
also involve different preparatory operations (Miyake et al., 2004).
Furthermore, task verbalization has been consistently shown to
affect performance in diverse task-switching paradigms including
the list paradigm or its variant, the pre-cued task sequence
paradigm (Goschke, 2000; Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson and
Miyake, 2003; Kray et al., 2004; Saeki and Saito, 2004), as well as
the random task cuing paradigm (Miyake et al., 2004). Based on
these behavioral findings, we assumed that an important compo-
nent of advance preparation may consist in the retrieval of a verbal
task or goal representation into working memory (Goschke, 2000,
2003), especially if one has to switch between novel and
unpracticed tasks with arbitrary s-r-mappings. Support for this
verbal goal retrieval hypothesis was obtained in previous own
experiments in which participants responded either repeatedly to
the color or the identity of letters, or alternated between the two
tasks (Goschke, 2000). When participants verbalized the next task
(‘‘letter’’ or ‘‘color’’) prior to the imperative stimulus, switch costs
were reliably reduced compared to when they were given no time
to prepare. Importantly, this reduction of switch costs was com-
pletely eliminated when task verbalization during the preparation
interval was prevented by articulatory suppression.
The purpose of the present event-related fMRI study was to
investigate brain processes associated with advance preparation in
a cued task switching paradigm with a random task sequence (see
also Meiran, 1996). In order to dissociate the target-related
component from the preparation-related component we systemati-
cally varied the cue-target-interval (CTI) in the range between 0and 1500 ms. This manipulation made it possible to dissociate
brain activity changes related to the processing of either the cue or
the target and, consequently, to sort out the activations associated
with endogenous task-management processes.Material and methods
Subjects
12 healthy right-handed volunteers (7 females, 5 males) took
part in our study (mean age = 25.5 years; SD = 1.7 years; age
range = 22–27 years). They were recruited in an academic
environment and were reported to be free from neurological and
psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, written informed consent to
participate in the study and ethical approval were obtained before
the experiment.
Experimental design
Subjects underwent fMRI while performing a cued task
switching paradigm, in which geometric objects differing in shape
and color had to be classified according to either color or shape
(Fig. 1). A task cue indicated which dimension was relevant for the
response to the subsequent target in the current trial. The respective
task cue was chosen pseudo-randomly for each trial and thus it was
unpredictable for the subject if an upcoming trial required a task
switch or not.
Stimuli were generated and presented using the ERTS software
(Experimental Run Time System, Version 3.11, BeriSoft Cooper-
ation, Frankfurt am Main, Germany). Each trial began with the
onset of a cue which was presented at the center of a black screen
indicating the relevant dimension for the subsequent response to
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task and a diamond as the cue for the color task (Fig. 1). By using
geometrical shapes (rather than words) as cues, we made sure that
activations in language-related brain areas would not be elicited
trivially due to the verbal mechanisms involved in word reading. On
each trial, the cue was presented for a variable cue-target interval
(CTI) which could either be 0 ms, 500 ms, 1000 ms, or 1500 ms.
Behavioral studies typically involve comparable preparation inter-
vals to ensure that preparation effects exert a significant influence
on switch costs (Goschke, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Miyake et al.,
2004). Targets consisted of two geometric figures with different
shapes which were colored in red or blue with equal frequency. The
target was presented on a black screen for a fixed interval (750 ms)
and was followed by a response phase. During the presentation of
the target, the cue also remained on screen and formed a frame
around the target. Visual stimulation during target presentation was
identical for each of the four delay-conditions, i.e., the cue always
surrounded the target for the whole presentation interval.
Subjects used their right hand to respond to the target stimuli
and were instructed to respond as fast and as accurately as possible.
They had to press a left button with their index finger in response
to the first object or the red color, and they had to press a right
button with their middle finger in response to the second object or
the blue color. As only one of the dimensions was response-
relevant within a single trial the targets could either be congruent
(i.e., both the relevant and the irrelevant dimension were mapped to
the same response button) or incongruent (i.e., the two dimensions
were mapped to different response buttons).
The design was completely balanced with respect to stimulus
combinations, trial transitions, switch trials, trial repetitions and
response congruency. In addition, every stimulus combination was
equally often response-relevant or response-irrelevant. Likewise,
switch trials and repeat trials occurred with identical frequency.
The trials were presented in a pseudo-random order. Altogether,
subjects performed 643 experimental trials over the course of three
fMRI scans. There were 6 cue-conditions and 6 target-conditions,
resulting from the factorial combination of the three CTIs (500 ms/
1000 ms/1500 ms) and the task-repeat vs. task-switch manipu-
lation. Trials with a CTI of 0 ms on which the cue and the target
were presented simultaneously, were modeled separately in the
statistical analyses as they did not allow a dissociation of cue- and
target-related activations.
Independently of the CTI variation, trials of each task type were
also systematically jittered (with 0 ms, 375 ms, 750 ms or 1125 ms)
with respect to the onset of the cues in order to allow for over-
sampling of the fMRI data. The first trial of the first scan served as a
dummy trial in order to assure that the design remained completely
balanced as it was neither a switch nor a repeat trial and was
consequently excluded from the analysis.
Subjects underwent only a short training session outside the
scanner to make sure that the task was understood.
fMRI measurement
The experiment was carried out on a 3-T MRI scanner (Bruker
Medspec 30/100; Bruker BioSpin MRI GmbH, Ettlingen, Ger-
many) equipped with a circularly polarized head coil. Subjects
underwent three experimental runs during each of which 604
functional image volumes were acquired consisting of twenty axial
slices (voxel size 3  3  5 mm3, distance factor = 0.2) parallel to
the AC-PC plane. For this, we used a single-shot gradient EPIsequence (Inter-scan interval 1500 ms, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90-,
field of view 192 mm, 64  64 matrix). In the same session, we
also obtained corresponding anatomical MDEFT (modified driven
equilibrium Fourier transform pulse sequence) and EPI-T1 (echo-
planar imaging, t1-weighted) slices. Furthermore, in a prior session
a high-resolution structural scan (3D MDEFT) was obtained for
each subject.
Behavioral data analysis
Error and omission trials as well as outliers of more than two
standard deviations for each trial type were excluded from the
reaction time (RT) analysis. Three subjects had to be excluded
from the further analysis. One was unable to complete the
experiment due to claustrophobia, the other two participants
committed too many errors (i.e., more than 25%). The remaining
9 subjects performed well on the task, and individual percentages
of errors did not exceed 15%. Behavioral data were analyzed by
means of an ANOVA with the factors duration of preparation
interval (preparation effect), switch/repeat (switch costs), incon-
gruency/congruency (response conflict), and sessions 1 to 3
(habituation effect).
fMRI data analysis
Preprocessing of the functional images used SPM99 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) and comprised
corrections for slicetime acquisition differences, motion artifacts
and low frequency fluctuations, coregistration, normalization into
standard stereotactic space (using the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template) and spatial smoothing with a Gaussian
kernel (FWHM = 12 mm). In event-related single-subject analyses,
6 cue-conditions and 6 target-conditions (resulting from the
factorial combination of the three CTIs (500 ms/1000 ms/1500
ms) and the task-repeat vs. task-switch manipulation) as well as the
two (switch vs. repeat) types of trials with a CTI of 0 ms, on which
the cue and the target were presented simultaneously, were
modeled as separate conditions. The resulting design matrix
allowed to test for brain activity changes associated with these
different events occurring at different time points in the course of
the experiment. The specific statistical contrasts that were
calculated are described in detail in Results. For group statistics,
random effects analyses were performed on single-subject contrast
images at a threshold of P < 0.001, uncorrected. We report only
those activation foci which reached a minimum cluster size of 10
voxels. For brain regions for which there was an a priori hypothesis
because they had been reported to be activated during the processes
under investigation in previous similar studies (e.g., Brass and von
Cramon, 2002), we used small volume corrections for spheres
around the previously reported activation foci in the standard
Talairach coordinate system with a radius of 10 mm. In these cases,
statistical significance is reported at the level of P < 0.05,
corrected.Results
Behavioral data
The behavioral data were analyzed with respect to both mean
reaction times and error rates. Longer reaction times were
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cannot be explained simply by speed-accuracy tradeoffs.
As regards reaction times, we observed significant effects of the
trial type, with switch trials producing prolonged RTs as compared
to repeat trials (778 ms vs. 726 ms; F = 31.30; P < 0.001).
Response incongruency of the irrelevant stimulus dimension was
associated with increased RTs as well (771 ms vs. 733 ms; F =
12.25; P < 0.01). Time provided for task preparation led to a
reduction of RTs (see Fig. 2; F = 95.58; P < 0.000005), whereas
there was no main effect of experimental session (F = 1.91; P =
0.181). Furthermore, subjects exhibited a significant reduction of
switch costs due to advance preparation of task switches (F = 7.38;
P < 0.005; Fig. 2), whereas there were no habituation effects, i.e.,
changes of switch costs, during the course of the three experimen-
tal sessions (F = 0.14; P = 0.867).
The mean error rate of the nine subjects whose functional
neuroimaging data were analyzed was 6% (standard deviation =
2.5%). Mirroring the RT data, we observed a significant decrease
in errors when participants had more time to prepare the task in
advance (0 ms CTI: 11.8%, 500 ms CTI: 5.5%, 1000 ms CTI:
3.1%, 1500 ms CTI: 3.4%; F = 3.29; P < 0.05). Incongruent trials
were associated with significantly more errors than congruent trials
(9.2% vs. 2.7%; F = 5.70; P < 0.05). Apart from that, the other
effects that reached statistical significance with respect to the
reaction time data (see above) did not reach the statistical criterion
of P < 0.05 when looking at subjects’ error rates.
Imaging data
Analyses of the imaging data pursued three different goals: (1)
the dissociation of cue- and target-related brain activity, (2) the
assessment of possible neural activity associated more specifically
with task switches, switch costs as well as the observed elimination
of switch costs due to advance preparation, and (3) investigation of
brain activity associated with the prolonged reaction times to
targets without advance preparation of the task.
In the first step of analysis, we calculated the contrasts ‘‘targets
versus (implicit) baseline’’, ‘‘cues versus (implicit) baseline’’ as well
as the direct contrasts ‘‘cues versus targets’’ and ‘‘targets versus
cues’’ in order to investigate the functional contribution of differentFig. 2. Advance preparation led to reduced reaction times both in switch
and repeat trials (F = 95.58; P < 0.000005) as well as to a reduction of
switch costs (F = 7.38; P < 0.005).brain areas to cue- and/or target-related processes. Thereby, target
conditions in which the cue was presented simultaneously to the
target (CTI = 0 ms) were excluded because these conditions did not
allow to dissociate target-related brain activations from those
associated with cues. First, we investigated which brain regions
were significantly activated in target conditions versus baseline.
Activations associated with the target presentation and the response
were found predominantly in occipital regions along the ventral
visual pathway as well as in the left motor hand area, the cingulate
motor area (CMA), the frontal eye field (FEF) and the cerebellum
(Table 1, Fig. 3A).
Subsequently, we looked at cue-related activations. The contrast
‘‘cues versus baseline’’ revealed significant activations in left (and
right) premotor cortices along the dorsal and posterior border of
Broca’s area close to the inferior frontal junction (IFJ), along the
right anterior inferior frontal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus, in the
left frontal eye field as well as bilaterally along the intraparietal
sulcus, in extrastriate cortex and along the ventral visual pathway
(Fig. 3B; see also Table 2). Importantly, activity in these brain
regions was also found to be significantly enhanced in the contrast
‘‘cues versus targets’’ (Table 2) thus confirming the specificity of
these cue-related activations as compared to brain activity related
to target processing subsequent to advance preparation. Likewise,
the opposite contrast, i.e., ‘‘targets versus cues’’, confirmed that
brain activity in visual and motor areas (see above and Table 1)
could be specifically attributed to the processing of targets and to
task execution.
The second part of our statistical analyses of the imaging data
addressed the question of whether specific neural activity can be
observed in relation to task switches, switch costs and/or the
elimination of switch costs that was observable after the longest
preparation interval in our experiment. We looked for activations
specific to task switches by comparing all cues implicating a switch
with all cues implicating a task repetition, and found no significant
activation related to these task differences (at P < 0.001,
uncorrected). Because switch costs were maximal without advance
preparation (see Fig. 2), we assessed possible neural correlates of
these switch costs by comparing brain activity during the
simultaneous presentation of cue and target for task switches
versus task repetitions. Again, no significant brain activity differ-
ences were found in this comparison at P < 0.001, uncorrected.
Finally, we calculated a statistical contrast aiming at the detection
of brain correlates associated with the elimination of switch costs
after the longest preparation interval, i.e., the interaction contrast
‘‘(target after switch and 500 ms CTI minus target after repeat and
500 ms CTI) minus (target after switch and 1500 ms CTI minus
target after repeat and 1500 ms CTI)’’. Once again, this contrast did
not show any significant brain activity changes related to the
elimination of switch costs due to advance preparation. In order to
substantiate the null findings reported in this paragraph, we
followed the reviewers’ suggestions and also used regions of
interest reported in the studies by Braver et al. (2003), by Crone
et al. (2005), and by DiGirolamo et al. (2001), to perform small
volume corrections at P < 0.05. Even when using this more lenient
statistical criterion, we were unable to find significant activations
in these ROIs related to task switches per se, to switch costs, or to
the interaction effect of advance preparation on switch costs in our
data set.
In the final step of the imaging data analyses, we investigated
the hypothesis that similar brain processes as those underlying
advance preparation for the upcoming task in general (see Fig. 3B)
Table 1
Brain regions activated during target processing after advance task preparation (P < 0.001, uncorrected)
Region Target vs. Baseline Target vs. Cue
Talairach coordinates Statistical effects
(T value)
Talairach coordinates Statistical effects
(T value)
L inferior occipital gyrus 24 92 16 8.34 28 100 8 4.99
R lateral occipito-temporal sulcus 44 64 12 9.10 – –
L motor cortex (hand area) 44 36 48 6.62 36 24 64 5.78
R cingulate motor area 4 16 36 5.19 4 12 28 15.53
L frontal eye field 24 12 64 6.14 36 24 64 5.78
L cerebellum 21 56 32 5.83 20 56 16 5.35
R cerebellum 16 56 28 7.15 12 56 16 6.50
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times to targets without advance preparation of the task. For this
purpose, we compared brain responses to targets without advance
preparation to neural responses to targets with advance preparation
(of different durations). This contrast revealed increased brain
activation to ‘‘unprepared targets’’ bilaterally along the dorsal–
posterior border of Broca’s area close to the inferior frontal
junction (IFJ) and in the intraparietal cortex as well as along the
right anterior inferior frontal sulcus, i.e., in areas that also showed
enhanced activity in association to cue presentation (see Table 2;
cf. Figs. 3B and C).Fig. 3. Brain activations associated with (A) target processing (contrast ‘‘targets
(contrast ‘‘cues versus implicit baseline’’) and (C) with task-set activation during p
advance preparation versus targets with advance preparation’’) rendered onto a s
uncorrected, with minimal cluster size of 10 voxels.Discussion
In this study we investigated neural correlates of advance
preparation in task switching. For this purpose, we adopted a task-
switching paradigm that had already produced consistent results in
behavioral investigations. As we wanted to separate preparation-
related from execution-related processes despite the temporal
restrictions of the fMRI method we employed a manipulation of
the preparation interval (ranging from 0 to 1500 ms) which is
commonly used in behavioral studies (Goschke, 2000; Miyake
et al., 2004), but which is also applicable in an event-related fMRIversus implicit baseline’’), (B) with advance preparation in task switching
resentation of targets without advance preparation (contrast ‘‘targets without
urface reconstruction of the MNI template and thresholded at P < 0.001,
Table 2
Brain regions activated during advance preparation following cue presentation and during task activation in response to targets without advance preparationa














L dorsal Broca’s area (IFJ) 40 4 32 5.41 48 4 24 7.82 52 8 16 7.64
R dorsal Broca homologue (IFJ) 40 8 24 4.20** 40 8 24 5.15 44 12 24 6.40
R anterior inferior frontal sulcus 40 44 16 9.03 44 44 16 6.48 40 40 16 6.03
L frontal eye field 24 0 52 4.14** 24 0 52 7.92 – –
L intraparietal cortex 24 60 40 4.77 24 64 40 11.03 24 60 40 8.13
R intraparietal cortex 36 52 52 4.50* 36 56 52 6.14 36 52 52 5.82
L/R extrastriate cortex 8 100 4 4.07** 20 96 8 8.87 – –
L lateral occipito-temporal sulcus – – 36 80 16 6.21* – –
R lateral occipito-temporal sulcus – – 36 76 16 6.95* – –
a All activations were significant at P < 0.05, corrected for small volumes (with a sphere radius of 10 mm), if not otherwise indicated (*P < 0.001,
uncorrected; **P < 0.005, uncorrected).
O. Gruber et al. / NeuroImage 31 (2006) 887–895892design. By further deploying a rather short inter-scan interval of
1.5 s (previous fMRI studies used an inter-scan interval of 2 s or
more; e.g., MacDonald et al., 2000; Luks et al., 2002; Rushworth
et al., 2002; Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Forstmann et al.,
2005) in combination with systematic jittering this design achieved
both a high effective temporal resolution (cf. Miezin et al., 2000)
and a clear dissociation of cue- and target-related processing (see
Figs. 3A and B). Thus, on the one hand, we were able to avoid long
preparation intervals like the ones used in previous fMRI studies on
task preparation (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000).
These long preparation intervals had been criticized as to inherently
involve working memory as a means for the maintenance of
information leading to ‘‘trivial’’ activations of regions involved in
verbal working memory (Brass and von Cramon, 2004). On the
other hand, the experimental design of the present study also
allowed to dissociate cue- from target-related processing without
having to insert infrequent null events without visual stimulation as
it was done in another recent study (Brass and von Cramon, 2002).
These infrequent null events might entail the inherent risk to be
confounded by oddball– related activations which would probably
affect all subtraction–contrasts involving null events.
On the behavioral level, longer durations of the cue-target
interval allowing for advance preparation led to strikingly reduced
reaction times (both in switch and in repeat trials) and to a
significant reduction of switch costs (Fig. 2). This finding is
consistent with the results of previous behavioral studies which
showed the beneficial effect of advance preparation on task
performance (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996; Meiran
et al., 2000). On the other hand, the observation that mean reaction
times were decreased both in switch and repetition trials when
increasing the preparation interval (see Fig. 2) supports the
assumption that preparation processes may take place independent
of whether the task is switched or repeated (see, for example, Brass
and von Cramon, 2002).
Dissociation of cue- and target-related brain activity
Using the experimental variations described above, the neural
processes underlying advance preparation were assessed by
temporally dissociating neural activation during cue presentation
from neural activation during presentation of targets after adQ
vance preparation. The corresponding statistical contrasts revealedneural responses in a fronto-parietal network (Fig. 3B, Table 2).
Notably, these regions were not activated during pre-cued target
processing (see Fig. 3A and Table 1), which indicates that they may
represent a network specific to task preparation. When lowering the
statistical criterion we further replicated a cue-related activation
cluster in the pre-SMA (x = 4, y = 20, z = 48; P < 0.05; cf.
Rushworth et al., 2002) that also did not occur during task
execution. In striking contrast to the cue-related activity, activation
related to pre-cued targets was only observed in brain areas along
the ventral visual pathway subserving the processing of visual
objects, on the one hand, and in regions involved in motor
execution, e.g., the left primary motor cortex and the right
cerebellum, on the other.
These findings are in accordance with the results of several
previous studies which were interested in general aspects of
advance preparation (MacDonald et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000;
Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Luks et al., 2002) or in preparation
for task switches (Sohn et al., 2000; Rushworth et al., 2002;
Peria´n˜ez et al., 2004). They are also consistent with two more
recent studies which tried to further disentangle processes related
to simple cue encoding from endogenous control processes
presumably associated with active goal retrieval and updating of
the relevant task-set during task preparation (Brass and von
Cramon, 2004; Forstmann et al., 2005). In these studies, the IFJ
and other frontal areas as well as the intraparietal cortex and to a
minor extent also the pre-SMA have been shown quite consistently
to be involved in task preparation and have been suggested to
reflect endogenous control mechanisms that go beyond simple cue
encoding (MacDonald et al., 2000; Luks et al., 2002; Rushworth
et al., 2002; Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Peria´n˜ez et al.,
2004; Forstmann et al., 2005). The present study replicated this
fronto-parietal network giving further support for its particular role
in advance preparation in task switching. However, it is important
to note that activation of these regions has been observed across
different tasks addressing different processing domains and also
both in switch and in repetition trials. For example, these frontal
and parietal brain areas have been reported to be active during
advance preparation in cued task-switching paradigms involving
either semantic categorization (Sohn et al., 2000; Luks et al.,
2002; Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Forstmann et al.,
2005), visual categorization (Rushworth et al., 2002), or switching
in a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Peria´n˜ez et al., 2004). Taken
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parietal preparation network that was also observed in the present
study is involved in the preparation of upcoming tasks and reflects
general preparatory processes that are independent of paradigm-
specific processing and common to both switch and repetition
trials. The present study is the first to unequivocally show that
these neural processes are indeed related to advance preparation,
and not to task execution.
Evaluating predictions of the Fmental gear changing_ perspective
on task switching
Traditionally, behavioral studies have primarily focused on the
effects of advance preparation on switch costs. The reason for this
is, that switch costs are usually presumed to be an indicator of an
endogenous control process which is characterized as ‘‘a sort of
mental Fgear changing_’’ by some authors (e.g., Monsell, 2003).
Recently however, an alternative view on cognitive control in task
switching has been proposed which considers task activation
(instead of task switching) to be the functional process in cognitive
control (Altmann, 2004). These two models, the Fmental gear
changing model_ and the Factivation model_, make different
predictions with regard to brain activation underlying cognitive
control processes in the present study. According to the Fmental
gear changing model_ such brain activation could be expected to be
detected by statistical contrasts that, for instance, compare switch
trials (that require Fmental gear changing_) with repeat trials (that
do not require Fmental gear changing_). By contrast, the Factivation
model_ would predict that the same preparatory processes are
active during both task switching and task repetition, i.e., the
underlying brain activation should be subtracted out in the above-
mentioned statistical contrast.
We addressed the predictions of the Fmental gear changing
model_ by searching for neural activity specifically associated with
task switches (by comparing all cues implicating a switch with all
cues implicating a task repetition), switch costs (by comparing brain
activity during task switches versus task repetitions in trials without
advance preparation) and the reduction of switch costs due to
advance preparation (by calculating the interaction contrast ‘‘(target
after switch and 500 ms CTI minus target after repeat and 500 ms
CTI) minus (target after switch and 1500 ms CTI minus target after
repeat and 1500 ms CTI)’’, cf. Fig. 2). None of these statistical
contrasts showed any significant brain activity changes. This
suggests (1) that cue-related brain activation (see Fig. 3B) was
virtually identical during both task switches and task repetitions,
and (2) that there were no changes of regional brain activity
associated with switch costs per se and their reduction due to
advance preparation. Of course, such null findings have to be
interpreted very cautiously, and we cannot exclude that other studies
with a higher number of subjects may reveal such activations related
to task switches in general, to switch costs and/or their reduction
following advance preparation. However, it is important to mention
that these findings are fully compatible with recent results by Brass
et al. (2003) and Crone et al. (2005). Both of these studies were
equally unable to detect brain activity associated with switching
processes per se, but merely reported brain activations related to
task switching under bivalent response conditions only, which were
correctly interpreted by the authors themselves as (probably) being
related to ‘‘recoding of response meaning’’ and ‘‘rule representa-
tion’’. Furthermore, these functional neuroimaging results could be
easily reconciled with the Factivation model_, i.e., with the view thatthe same preparatory control processes operate on switch and repeat
trials and that switch costs may represent an emergent property
(perhaps reflecting priming effects) rather than an index of
functional activity (see Altmann, 2004).
Evidence for the Ftask activation perspective_ on advance
preparation in task switching
Another important aspect of the Factivation model_ is that,
rather than focusing on switch costs, it emphasizes the functional
significance of the main effect of task preparation on behavioral
performance which is the overall reduction of reaction times both
in switch and in repeat trials. This main effect of task preparation
was also the most striking behavioral effect in the present study
(see Fig. 2). Therefore, we were also interested in determining the
brain processes that were associated with the longer reaction
times to ‘‘unprepared’’ targets as compared to targets presented
after preparation intervals. In particular, if according to the
Factivation model_ the function of general preparatory control
processes is to activate the current task set, one may expect the
very same processes to occur in response to the presentation of
targets when no time had been given to activate the current task
set in advance. Indeed, when we compared targets without
advance preparation to targets with advance preparation, we
found enhanced brain activity in the same fronto-parietal network
that was also activated during advance preparation of upcoming
tasks (see Table 2; cf. Figs. 3C and B). This finding not only
provides further empirical evidence for the Ftask-set activation
perspective_ on advance preparation in task switching, but it also
helps to reconcile apparently contradictory results of two previous
studies.
In contrast to most prior studies on task preparation in which
target-related processing seemingly was of minor interest, these
two studies explicitly reported target-related brain activity (Brass
and von Cramon, 2002; Luks et al., 2002). Both of these studies
found several brain areas within the fronto-parietal network,
whose activity was increased by cue presentation, to be also
activated following target presentation. While on the first sight
this might strongly argue against a role of this network in task
preparation, the present results provide a clue on how to account
for these findings. Luks et al. (2002), for instance, observed
activation of these frontal and parietal regions only in response to
neutrally cued targets, i.e., in conditions in which subjects did not
get a reliable task cue in advance, but only simultaneously with
the target stimulus. In this situation, which is similar to the target
condition without advance preparation in our experiment, it is
only possible to activate the new task by the onset of the target.
In a similar way, a delayed task-set activation may also be
provoked by a lack of the explicit instruction to prepare
immediately after cue appearance, and this may be one possible
explanation for the frontal and parietal activations observed
during target processing in the study by Brass and von Cramon
(2002). On the other hand, the results of the present study as
depicted in Tables 1 and 2 as well as in Fig. 3 clearly
demonstrate that, if subjects are explicitly instructed to prepare
the tasks and if they are informed about the upcoming task in
advance, the fronto-parietal network is activated exclusively in
response to the cue, and not to the target. Consistent with this
finding, in the study by Luks et al. (2002), those targets, which
were informatively pre-cued, did not lead to an activation of these
frontal and parietal areas.
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In accordance with the Factivation perspective_ on task switch-
ing, the present study indicates that a network of frontal and parietal
brain regions is involved in the activation, i.e., configuration of task
sets, either as soon as a cue allows advance preparation of the
upcoming task, or at the time the target stimulus is presented together
with the cue. However, the question remains which functions exactly
are supported by activity in these brain regions. Cognitive
psychologists have linked preparatory processes in task switching
to perceptual encoding (e.g., Logan and Bundesen, 2003), memory
encoding (e.g., Altmann, 2002, 2004), or to memory retrieval (e.g.,
Mayr and Kliegl, 2003). For instance, recent behavioral evidence
suggests that the main effect of task preparation, i.e., the general
reduction of reaction times in both switch and repeat conditions, is
linked to the need to retain the task cue in memory (Altmann, 2004).
Another line of evidence supports the assumption that task-set
activation may, at least in part, rely on verbal processing. Several
recent behavioral studies have shown that articulation of task-
irrelevant words during the preparation interval impaired task-
switching performance and eliminated the beneficial effects of a
long preparation interval, presumably due to interference with verbal
self instruction (Goschke, 2000; Emerson and Miyake, 2003;
Miyake et al., 2004; Saeki and Saito, 2004; see also: Mecklinger
et al., 1999). While functional neuroimaging experiments certainly
allow to identify neural correlates of pre-determined functional
processes, they can only provide some indirect evidence to answer
questions on the exact functional processes that take place in an
activated brain region. Nevertheless, our finding of fronto-parietal
activations related advance preparation and task-set activation,
particularly in dorsal Broca’s area near the left IFJ, in the left
intraparietal cortex and along the right anterior inferior frontal
sulcus, appears to be fully compatible with the view that verbal
processes may be a component of advance configuration of task-sets
because very similar brain activations have been repeatedly
demonstrated to underlie the articulatory rehearsal component of
verbal working memory (cf., for example, Gruber, 2001; Gruber and
von Cramon, 2001; Gruber and von Cramon, 2003; Chen and
Desmond, 2005). On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the
existing evidence for task verbalization to play a functional role in
the advance preparation of upcoming tasks cannot be generalized to
every task-switching paradigm. There certainly may be conditions in
which verbal processes are not obligatory to prepare for a task, e.g.,
when direct cues are used, when switching is highly predictable, or
when subjects have overlearned the task and have established a
direct association between cues and response mapping rules. Such
conditions were avoided in the present experiment. Furthermore,
one may speculate that the need for (verbal) memory encoding (see
Altmann, 2004) and/or (verbal) memory retrieval (see Mayr and
Kliegl, 2003) may also crucially depend on the exact nature of the
cue. For instance, indirect cues like the diamonds and squares used
in the present study are likely to necessitate verbal memory retrieval
processes in contrast to direct cues, e.g., the words ‘‘shape’’ and
‘‘color’’ (see alsoMiyake et al., 2004). Moreover, in particular under
conditions of interference (e.g., under articulatory suppression) as
well as in non-human species (e.g., see Stoet and Snyder, 2003),
other, perhaps phylogenetically older neural mechanisms may
account for some residual task preparation abilities. The existence
of such a degeneracy of neural systems in the human brain
(e.g., Tononi et al., 1999; Price and Friston, 2002) has been
demonstrated in a similar way with respect to verbal workingmemory functions (see Gruber, 2001; Gruber and Goschke, 2004).
Finally, given that verbalizing the next task has been found to
facilitate performance on switch trials much more than on repeat
trials (Goschke, 2000, Exp. 2; Miyake et al., 2004), one may
wonder why we did not observe stronger activation in language
areas on switch trials relative to repeat trials. One explanation for
this finding is that in the present experiment participants had to
use inner speech both on switch and repeat trials in order to recode
the arbitrary task cues into a verbal task representation.Conclusions
In the present event-related fMRI investigation of neural
correlates of advance preparation in task switching, we were able
to show that distinct brain areas are involved in task preparation and
in the subsequent execution of the task. While advance preparation
led to activation in a fronto-parietal network, processing of targets
following advance preparation was merely associated with activa-
tion of brain regions subserving visual processing and motor
execution. However, enhanced activity of the fronto-parietal
network was also observed in response to targets without advance
preparation. Consistent with the Ftask-set activation_ hypothesis of
advance preparation in task switching (see Altmann, 2004), this
result suggests that advance preparation encompasses the same
processes that are also active during target presentation if no prior
information was available about the upcoming task. On the other
hand, we were unable to find empirical support for the Fmental gear
changing model_ of task switching as no significant brain activation
was observable in statistical contrasts testing for neural activity
associated with task switches, switch costs per se or the influence of
advance preparation on switch costs. Since activation of the fronto-
parietal network observed in the present study has been replicated
across different (e.g., semantic and visual) task switching paradigms
and both in switch and in repetition trials, this network appears to
represent more general preparatory processes that allow to activate
the task set prior to the occurrence of the target. In the light of
previous behavioral studies on interference effects of articulatory
suppression on task preparation in humans, we assume that
verbalization mechanisms may constitute an important means for
assuring the effective configuration of the relevant task set during
task preparation.Acknowledgments
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